ABOUT THE AUTHOR George Hunt Williamson served with the Army Air Corps during World War II as Radio Director for the Army Air Forces Technical Training..

The opening lines of Franz Delitzsch's Babel und Bibel offer an unusually frank confession of the personal and psychological motives that animated German orientalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For Delitzsch and countless others like him, orientalist scholarship provided an opportunity not just to expand their knowledge of the Near East and India, but also to explore the world of the Bible and, in doing so, effect a reckoning with the religious beliefs of their childhoods. In German Orientalism (...) in the Age of Empire, Suzanne Marchand opens up this scholarly world, exploring the criss-crossing forces and interests that shaped it, while effecting her own reckoning with orientalism as a historical and historiographical phenomenon. (shrink)

Since the dawn of Romanticism, artists and intellectuals in Germany have maintained an abiding interest in the gods and myths of antiquity while calling for a new mythology suitable to the modern age. In this study, George S. Williamson examines the factors that gave rise to this distinct and profound longing for myth. In doing so, he demonstrates the entanglement of aesthetic and philosophical ambitions in Germany with some of the major religious conflicts of the nineteenth century. Through (...) readings of key intellectuals ranging from Herder and Schelling to Wagner and Nietzsche, Williamson highlights three crucial factors in the emergence of the German engagement with myth: the tradition of Philhellenist neohumanism, a critique of contemporary aesthetic and public life as dominated by private interests, and a rejection of the Bible by many Protestant scholars as the product of a foreign, "Oriental" culture. According to Williamson, the discourse on myth in Germany remained bound up with problems of Protestant theology and confessional conflict through the nineteenth century and beyond. A compelling adventure in intellectual history, this study uncovers the foundations of Germany's fascination with myth and its enduring cultural legacy. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Das Thema des Gottesdienstes hat in der neueren theologiegeschichtlichen Forschung bislang keine hinreichende Beachtung gefunden. Die Diskussionen über die Notwendigkeit des Gottesdienstes, seinen Charakter und seinen Symbolgehalt führten am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts zu einer grundsätzlichen Erörterung des positiven Charakters des Christentums und seiner institutionellen Rolle in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Die Schriften Immanuel Kants, Carl Friedrich Stäudlins und Friedrich von Hardenbergs belegen den damaligen Wandel der Gottesdienstauffassung, indem sie die Ideen der Französischen Revolution und deren Implikationen für das religiöse (...) Leben thematisieren. Kants Unterscheidung von politischer und moralischer Religion nutzte Stäudlin, um die theophilanthropische Form eines aufklärerischen Gottesdienstes zu kritisieren. Novalis beurteilte die Theophilanthropie, die er als Negation jeglicher genuinen Religion ansah, ebenfalls kritisch. In Kants, Stäudlins und Novalis' Stellungnahmen zu Fragen des Gottesdienstes deutet sich zugleich der Übergang von aufklärerischen Religionskategorien zu frühromantischen Religionsmotiven an. (shrink)

This guide focuses primarily on the sometimes difficult or obscure poetry of John Donne, George Herbert, Richard Crashaw, Abraham Cowley, Henry Vaughan, and Andrew Marvell, but it also deals with some of the lesser poets who can legitimately be included under the heading of metaphysical poets.

Like a typical volume of the Library of Living Philosophers series, this volume has three parts, beginning with a short philosophical autobiography by the philosopher in question, Hans-Georg Gadamer. “Reflections on my Philosophical Journey” is partly a recounting of significant moments of Gadamer’s academic career and his postretirement career as a traveling lecturer, and partly a reassessment of the strengths and shortcomings of his major work, Truth and Method. He seems to wish to defend the political significance of hermeneutics against (...) what he terms, without naming names, “method-fanatics and ideology-critics”. An exploration of the factors that motivated his thinking, he suggests, will prove hermeneutics to possess both methodical rationality and a critical, emancipatory capacity. To this end, he sketches the relation of his central concepts to those of other thinkers, mainly Heidegger, Hegel, Kant, Plato, and Aristotle, emphasizing his recouping of ancient Greek “practical philosophy” against “scholasticism”. Practical philosophy, Gadamer insists, supplies a model of rationality that steers a middle course between absolute conceptual fixity and empty relativism, and can achieve the right balance of openness in unconstrained dialogue, yet remain tied to real human praxis. As such, hermeneutics offers the possibility of relevantly addressing and entering into dialogue with the Other, a capacity perhaps essential to the viability of modern politics. (shrink)

Identifying Selfhood organizes many of the features of Ricoeur’s philosophical views around the major theme of selfhood, Ricoeur’s hermeneutical quest for a “non-idealistic interpretation of the self.” In a quasi-developmental account, the author, Henry Isaac Venema, provides the reader with numerous details of Ricoeur’s relation to phenomenology and hermeneutics, as well as the complexities of Ricoeur’s views of self-constitution and self-understanding, involving the use of symbolism, metaphor, and narrative.

Entre-Nous is a valuable collection of essays, arranged chronologically from the early 1950s to the late 1980s, by the Lithuanian cum French Jewish thinker who died in 1995.

Book review of Jon Williamson's `In Defence of objective Bayesianism'.

Indeterminacy in its various forms has been the focus of a great deal of philosophical attention in recent years. Much of this discussion has focused on the status of vague predicates such as ‘tall’, ‘bald’, and ‘heap’. It is determinately the case that a seven-foot person is tall and that a five-foot person is not tall. However, it seems difficult to pick out any determinate height at which someone becomes tall. How best to account for this phenomenon is, of course, (...) a controversial matter. For example, some (such as Sorensen (2001) and Williamson (2002)) maintain that there is a precise height at which someone becomes tall and such apparent cases of indeterminacy merely reflects our ignorance of this fact. Others maintain that there is some genuine – and not merely epistemic – indeterminacy present is such cases and offer various accounts of how best to account for it. Supervaluationists (such as Keefe (2008)), for example, claim that the indeterminacy with respect to vague terms lies in their not having a single definite extension. Rather, each term is associated with a range of possible precise extensions or precisifications such that it is semantically unsettled which is the correct extension. One precisification of ‘tall’ might allow that anyone over five feet ten inches is tall, whereas another would only allow those over six foot to qualify; but no precisification will take someone who is five foot to be tall, and someone who is seven foot will count as tall on all precisifications. Thus – while someone who is seven foot will be determinately tall and someone who is five foot determinately not so – it will be indeterminate whether someone who stands at five foot eleven inches is tall. -/- Yet, it is important to stress that putative cases of indeterminacy are not limited to vague predicates of this kind. Philosophers have invoked indeterminacy in discussions of topics as diverse as moral responsibility (Bernstein (forthcoming)), identity over time (Williams (2014)), and the status of the future (Barnes and Cameron (2009)). In this paper, we focus on two areas where discussion of various kinds of indeterminacy has been commonplace: physics and fiction. We propose a new model for understanding indeterminacy across these domains and argue that it has some notable advantages when compared to earlier accounts. Treating physics and fiction cases univocally also indicates an interesting connection between indeterminacy in these two areas. (shrink)

The Challenge of the Exception is the key that unlocked the ideas of Carl Schmitt, a leading political theorist and jurist who influenced the thoughts of, among others, Hannah Arendt, Carl Joachim Friedrich, Otto Kirchheimer, Hans Morgenthau, Franz Neumann, and Leo Strauss. Professor Schwab clearly articulates Schmitt's key concepts and relates their centrality to politics and the state, to the political theory of liberalism, democracy and authoritarianism, and to international relations. When Schwab treats Schmitt's interpretations of constitutional questions, for example, (...) he shows how political theory in Germany is inextricably linked with constitutional law, legal theory, and the country's history. Not content to merely deal with Schmitt's profound contributions to twentieth-century thought, Schwab devotes considerable space to the unconscionable compromises that he made with the Third Reich. This, however, failed to help him become the political and legal theorist of Hitler's Germany. Schwab shows how the new Schmitt was suspect from the beginning and, by 1936, Schmitt the hunter had become Schmitt the hunted. Schwab's presentation of the multifaceted Carl Schmitt exposes the reader to a truly interdisciplinary excursion into the humanities and social sciences. (shrink)

In epistemology and in philosophy of language there is fierce debate about the role of context in knowledge, understanding, and meaning. Many contemporary epistemologists take seriously the thesis that epistemic vocabulary is context-sensitive. This thesis is of course a semantic claim, so it has brought epistemologists into contact with work on context in semantics by philosophers of language. This volume brings together the debates, in a set of twelve specially written essays representing the latest work by leading figures in the (...) two fields. All future work on contextualism will start here. Contributors: Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Andy Egan, Michael Glanzberg, John Hawthorne, Ernest Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Peter Pagin, Georg Peter, Paul M. Pietroski, Gerhard Preyer, Jonathan Schaffer, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

Dispassionate cruelty and the euphoria of hunting or battle should be distinguished from the emotional savoring of victims' suffering. Such savoring, best called negative empathy, is what puzzles motivational theory. Hyperbolic discounting theory suggests that sympathy with people who have unwanted but seductive traits creates a threat to self-control. Cruelty to those people may often be the least effortful way of countering this threat.

George Bealer provides an account of intuitions as “intellectual seemings.” My purpose in this paper is to criticize the phenomenological considerations that Bealer offers in favor of his account. In the first part I review Bealer’s attempt to distinguish intuitions from beliefs, judgments, guesses, and hunches. I examine each of the three phenomenological differences – incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope – that Bealer adduces between intuitions and these other types of mental contents. I argue that any difference between intuitions and (...) these other types of mental contents with regards to their incorrigibility, implasticity, and scope is unproven and likely to remain unproven. In the second part I criticize Bealer’s analogy between intuitions and sensory seemings by suggesting that intuitions do not display the theoretical virtues—consistency, corroboration, and confirmation—that Bealer claims for them. Moreover, I suggest that intuitions do not display the theoretical virtue that would indicate a similarity to sensory seemings, consilience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychiatric Practice and the Living Force of the Social in the BiopsychosocialGeorge Ikkos, BSc, FRCPsych (bio) and Giovanni Stanghellini, MD, DPhil (HC) (bio)One of the handful of universally acknowledged founders of his discipline, sociologist Emile Durkheim (1857–1917; see Fournier, 2013) is best known to psychiatrists for his seminal “Suicide: A Study in Sociology” (1897/2002). Arguably, he should have been at least as well known for his last completed work (...) “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” (1912/1995), the best book of sociology ever written according to some (Bellah, 1995). In this magisterial work, through a comprehensive survey of the anthropological evidence available at the time and fine conceptual analysis, Durkheim came to define from a strictly secular perspective phenomena such as the sacred and the profane, soul and magic, but also “mana” (a penetrating and connecting force) and collective “effervescence” (wild gesticulating, copulating, or aggressing when aboriginal family groups came together). The last two concepts can help us to understand the origin and persistence of the living force of the social in our daily experience, that is, what it is, what it feels like and how it plays itself out in relationships (Ikkos & McQueen, 2019). Although he makes no reference to Durkheim, nor to mana nor effervescence, social anthropologist Ongaro’s welcome ambition is to lift the social out of the shadow of the dominating bio- and psychological in the use of the biopsychosocial model and, thus, bring it to bear as an immediately experienced and enacted living force akin to mana and effervescence in contemporary psychiatric practice.In this commentary, we first review issues relating to the biopsychosocial model, Ongaro’s externalist foundations, and predictive processing and functional neurological, somatic and mental symptoms. We then discuss our formulation of contemporary anorexia nervosa and hysteria as examples of our attempts at enhanced engagement with the social. We conclude by suggesting the work of social historian and cultural critic Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) as a vital resource for better engagement with the social in biopsychosocial practice in the future. [End Page 325]The Biopsychosocial ModelMany find that in current practice the biopsycho-social model is simply the biomedical cloaked in another name (Mohtashemi et al., 2016). Those most expert in it acknowledge doubts about what it is exactly (Bolton, 2022). Most would agree with Ongaro and Williamson that though not yet dead, if it is to survive as a clinical force in practice, it needs clarification and revival (Williamson, 2022). Bolton suggests that “we can make use of the term ‘biopsychosocial model’ as a shorthand for methodological assumptions that causes and/or cures of specific conditions at specific stages, including matters of adjustment and quality of life, will generally—across a wide range of conditions—include biological, psychological and social factors, and interactions between them. The contrast here is with the ‘biomedical model’, which deals with biological factors only” (Bolton, 2022). Bolton then discusses the utility and advantages of his definition of the model specifically in relation to research on the social determinants of disease and on pain. That is fine, as far as it goes, that is, research methodology and clinical theory. Ongaro, however, wants to ensure that the social is understood as a more immediately experienced and directly enacted force in clinical encounters. To achieve his aim, he argues, we need a more balanced and persuasive integration of all three components of the model: bio-psycho-social. In effect what he proposes is to vitalize psychiatry with something related to Durkheim’s ideas of mana and effervescence.Externalist FoundationsIn his first paper, Ongaro argues that he can partly achieve his aims by using the tools provided by our contemporary neuroscience research on “predictive processing” and philosophical theories of “enactivism” (Ongaro, 2024a). In his second paper he reports on his anthropological experience of living for 19 months with the Akha, a group of swidden farmers in highland Laos. Here he investigated how they respond to functional neurological disorders (FNDs), functional somatic symptoms (FSS) (Burton et al., 2020), also to what Western medicine defines as (functional) mental disorders (FMDs) and what the Akha and he sometimes conceive as spiritual... (shrink)

For some time it has been fashionable in literary circles to reject what is called scornfully the biographical method. It was inevitable. No mode lasts forever. Sooner or later, there is a change. This method was the law for too long. It had no rival. Under its tutelage the motto for teaching literature was “the man, his work”. It was by its authority that students were taught that La Fontaine was in charge of waterways and forests and master of the (...) hunt before writing his Fables, that they had to learn by heart; or that Beaumarchais had been a clockmaker, musician, secret agent and business man before inventing the character of Figaro, proposed for their admiration. There has been a reaction. Our irreverent and contentious age has put an end to that absolute sovereignty. For a good quarter of a century this practice and the assumptions on which it rests has been on trial, in the name of the various and at times even contradictory conceptions and theories about the nature of literature. These have in common, however, the belief in the independence of literature with regard to the human being who was the instrument of its creation, as well as the anathema cast by this fact on what is commonly accepted as “referential illusion”. (shrink)

According to Williamson , the difference between empirical subjective Bayesians and objective Bayesians is that, while both hold reasonable credence to be calibrated to evidence, the objectivist also takes such credence to be as equivocal as such calibration allows. However, Williamson’s prescription for equivocation generates constraints on reasonable credence that are objectionable. Herein Williamson’s calibration norm is explicated in a novel way that permits an alternative equivocation norm. On this alternative account, evidence calibrated probability functions are recognised (...) as implications of evidence calibrated density functions defined over chance hypotheses. The objective Bayesian equivocates between these calibrated density functions rather than between the calibrated probability functions themselves. The result is an objective Bayesianism that avoids the main problem afflicting Williamson’s original proposal. (shrink)

The passage containing this verb is in Resp. v. 450 B: χρυσοχοήσοντας οἴει τούσδε νῦν ἐνθάδε ἀφῖχθαι, ἀλλ᾽οὐ λόγων ἀκουσομένους; The situation is dramatic. Socrates, to his own mind, has just finished a discussion of the one part of his ideal state, and is intending to go on to the other. Polemarchus, however, seizes him by the cloak and at the same time whispers to Adeimantus. Then Adeimantus tells Socrates that they will hold him by force, until he explains further (...) some words of his that have aroused their interest, and finally Thrasymachus adds that they are unanimous in this decision. Socrates replies that they know not what a swarm of explanations they are stirring up. ‘Seeing this swarm,’ says he, ‘I let it pass, that it might not bother us greatly.’ Then Thrasymachus replies: ‘But do you think these persons have come here for gold-hunting , and not to hear explanations?’. (shrink)

Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard (...) to the probability function one should adopt as one’s belief function, Williamson advocates selecting the probability function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence while Masterton advocates selecting the expected probability function relative to the density function with greatest entropy compatible with one’s evidence. In this paper we discuss the significant relative strengths of these two positions. In particular, Masterton’s original proposal is further developed and investigated to reveal its significant properties; including its equivalence to the centre of mass inference process and its ability to accommodate higher order evidence. (shrink)

Nature's Teachings, first published in 1877, was one of many books on natural history by J. G. Wood, a Victorian clergyman who was hugely influential in popularising the subject, as well as being the editor of The Boy's Own Magazine. Here he examines the close parallels between nature and human inventions in areas including seafaring, war and hunting, architecture, tools, optics and acoustics, as well as 'useful arts' including sewage disposal. His text contains over 750 figures and illustrations, and he (...) argues that future great discoveries could be made as a result of careful observations of nature. Although a contemporary of Darwin, Wood largely ignored the evolution debates and focused on communicating his enthusiasm for the natural world to a non-scientific audience. His successful publications still make fascinating reading for those interested in Victorian culture and the history of education. (shrink)

Within anthropology, as elsewhere in the human sciences, there is a tendency to divide knowledge making into two separate poles: conceptual (theory) vs. empirical (ethnography). In Theory Can Be More than It Used to Be, Dominic Boyer, James D. Faubion, and George E. Marcus argue that we need to take a step back from the assumption that we know what theory is to investigate how theory—a matter of concepts, of analytic practice, of medium of value, of professional ideology—operates in (...) anthropology and related fields today. They have assembled a distinguished group of scholars to diagnose the state of the theory-ethnography divide in anthropology today and to explore alternative modes of analytical and pedagogical practice. Continuing the methodological insights provided in Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be, the contributors to this volume find that now is an optimal time to reflect on the status of theory in relation to ethnographic research in anthropology and kindred disciplines. Together they engage with questions such as, What passes for theory in anthropology and the human sciences today and why? What is theory's relation to ethnography? How are students trained to identify and respect anthropological theorization and how do they practice theoretical work in their later career stages? What theoretical experiments, languages, and institutions are available to the human sciences? Throughout, the editors and authors consider theory in practical terms, rather than as an amorphous set of ideas, an esoteric discourse of power, a norm of intellectual life, or an infinitely contestable canon of texts. A short editorial afterword explores alternative ethics and institutions of pedagogy and training in theory. Contributors: Andrea Ballestero, Rice University; Dominic Boyer, Rice University; Lisa Breglia, George Mason University; Jessica Marie Falcone, Kansas State University; James D. Faubion, Rice University; Kim Fortun, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; Andreas Glaeser, University of Chicago; Cymene Howe, Rice University; Jamer Hunt, Parsons The New School for Design and the Institute of Design in Umea, Sweden; George E. Marcus, University of California, Irvine; Townsend Middleton, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Deepa S. Reddy, University of Houston–Clear Lake; Kaushik Sunder Rajan, University of Chicago. (shrink)